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This interview is a prepublication version of an article that appeared in the Turkish 
journal Praxis in September 2002. The article published answers to questions posed 
by the journal editors to Alan Freeman, Riccardo Bellofiore and Hugo Radice. In this 
article I have assembled my own responses, taken from the original transcript, to 
provide an article summarising my views on the stage of evolution of the world 
economy in 2002 
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The present stage of globalisation 
Question 
What is Globalisation? How is globalisation transforming power relations in the 
contemporary world? 
Answer 
 
Rather than the fairly vague notion of globalisation in general, what is actually 
happening is the globalisation of capital, and this is what I shall concentrate on. Its 
impact on different nations is completely differentiated; its effect on power depends if 
you live in a poor country or a rich one.  
 
In a developing or third world country, as far as I can see more or less in every 
empirical case, the effect of participating in the world market in capital is 
fragmentation. You have the break-up of the old Soviet Union, of Yugoslavia, 
fissiparous tendencies in India, in Mexico, and so on. You have fragmentary 
tendencies, though not on such a scale, developing in China, and at an earlier time in 
history when the same capital globalisation was going on, the process led to the 
breakup of the Austrian Empire, the Ottoman empire, the division of Africa, and so 
on.  
 
The rich countries of today tend to the contrary to form larger blocks and this is, I 
think, because of the need for a larger scale of production in order to take part in and 
dominate a re-constituted global market; to generate economies of scale sufficient to 
deploy modern technology and also to secure influence sufficient to dominate the 
markets of the poor countries. One needs to operate in much larger scale.  
 
There are basically now three views or models of what may happen as a result. One 
view is that the three large blocks are beginning to function as one. National 
boundaries between North America, South-East Asia and Europe will gradually be 
abolished and a single global capital at least in the rich countries will emerge. This 
leaves out three quarters of world but at least you would have a unified financial, 
industrial, commercial and political structure in countries covering about a quarter of 
the world. 
 
The next thesis is that competition between blocks is increasing, so that differentiation 
and competition between regional blocs, dominated by rich countries, will increase as 
they jostle for elbow-room and economic dominance or even survival. 
 
The third thesis is that one nation is and will remain hegemonic. In the last century 
Britain played this role and and in the 1950s America did. Hegemony in this sense 
means that the leader can produce benefit to the rest of the world although perhaps it 
takes a larger share of the wealth. These benefits – rising living standards, access to 
new products and technologies, economic stability – lead to acceptance, however 
grudging, of the hegemonic right of the leading nation to organise the world system 
both financially and commercially, and also politically. Hence the terms ‘Pax 
Britannica’ and ‘Pax Americana’ This point of view has it that the USA can establish 
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a new such period, a new ‘Golden Age’ in which the deployment of new technology 
under US tutelage pulls the whole of the world forward towards the End of History 
and the liberal heaven that surely awaits us, even if every year it gets postponed by 
another decade. 
 
I think the evidence so far is against the first and third thesis. History shows that 
Britain did not retain its hegemony, and the end of that hegemony brought about a 
fierce competition between industrial nations that led first to war, then to a re-division 
of the world market accompanied by what amounts to a partial secession from the 
world market by Russia and large parts of Central Asia, and to a further war. History 
always throws up something new, and so we cannot rule out that the USA will not go 
down the same road. However, so far it has. It is unable to compete and so it runs up a 
spiralling deficit, it saps the other nations of their savings as a result, and thus 
produces an ever-increasing tendency towards competition between the three large 
blocks.  
 
I think one of the weaknesses of globalisation ‘theory’ is that it always talks in an 
abstract way about grand changes which, many of its advocates like to claim, are 
sweeping, automatic and inevitable. But one has to look at actual history and actual 
facts. Actually the recent phase of globalisation began in the 1980s with definite 
conscious political changes promoted clearly by the USA. It was not an endogenous 
process which the market produced out of itself, nor was it a long-term trend. It was a 
turning point, and an engineered one. This is not to say that this engineering did not 
harness market forces which had been at work for some time.  
 
But the 1980s and the present phase of world accumulation opened with a wave of 
market liberalisation that transformed the policies of the IMF and the World Bank to 
those with which we are now familiar, which  completely restructured world trade, 
abandoning GATT-style bilateral agreements for WTO-style multi-lateral agreements; 
a decisive but politically-organised move towards the creation of single market in 
capital and a single market in goods. These institutional changes, there is lots of 
evidence, were consciously brought about.  
Question 
 
What is the place of the nation state in the political struggle of the leftist groups and 
parties?  And how do you evaluate the anti-global so called Seattle movements? 
 
Answer 
 
Once you have a global stage, then every local action has a global impact. Perhaps the 
most graphic illustration of this is the situation in the Middle East. There is a conflict 
which, in a certain geographical sense is completely local, between Palestine and 
Israel or rather, between Israel and the Palestinians. But this intractable local crisis 
constantly erupts onto the global stage.  
 
The world situation is in my opinion structured by the fact that America is failing to 
reassume its status as the hegemonic leader by exporting capital to the rest of the 
world, that is it is failing to reconstruct the world with its money. So first, it will 
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increasingly have to reconstruct the world not only with its money but also with its 
army, which puts the state right back at the centre of the world stage; and second – 
completely integral to the first process – it  is dissolving the basis for political stability 
in growing areas of the world. 
 
As a consequence, apparently local crises are constantly being created which then 
erupt onto the global stage. This increasingly includes crises that are precisely centred 
on the question of what the state should do, because the state is the only instrument, 
for many people, with any hope of mobilising resources that might solve their most 
basic problems. 
 
Even where there is a high degree of stability the same process is at work. I can see 
this for example in London, where travelling to work is becoming almost impossible 
as a result of the large influx of people following the movement of world capital into 
the City and the prolonged growth of Finance and Business services.  
 
Apparently local disputes that might appear only to affect Londoners have rapidly 
generalised; even capital itself is divided about how to run the railways and tubes, and  
what the government’s role should be because, frankly, the privatised railways don’t 
work; literally, harming back perhaps to Mussolini’s days, the trains don’t run. Do 
you solve this with more privatisation or with more or different government 
intervention? This is an issue of national policy.  
 
However, nations throughout the world are divided over privatisation – as a result of a 
rapacious globalisation in which capital the world over is, instead of constituting new 
productive capacity, simply taking over and restructuring existing capacity, above all 
former state capacity. The debate in the United Kingdom about London’s railways 
becomes part of a complex global debate which is actually, first and foremost, a 
debate about what nation-states should do. So even the most enthusiastic of 
globalisers want the state to become involved, when they can’t get to work in the 
morning.  
 
Moreover starting from a minor thing – how a banker gets to work in the morning –a 
local situation is projected on to the global stage. This is why I am unconvinced by 
what Hugo was saying about trade unionism. Actually much of the running, in the 
recent disputes about whether the privatised railways were functioning as they should, 
was made by revitalised and very militant trade unions. In England, Hugo’s own 
country, union after union has elected militant or left-wing leaderships – yet for years 
we have been told by the ‘modernisers’ that trade unions were going to vanish. 
Suddenly, the unions are back. They were reconstituted precisely because of a certain 
popular sense, uniting their members with a public that at least grudgingly accepts the 
validity of their case, of the global importance of their local struggle. 
  
‘Globalisation’ is therefore as much about the impact of local events on the global 
stage, as vice versa. The actions of a tiny state or events in a tiny part of the world – 
be it Afghanistan, Chiapas, Porto Alegre or the West Bank – have  much greater 
effects than they did before globalisation got under way in its present form. In other 
words, the very thesis of globalisation contradicts the view that local events and local 
state action no longer has any impact. Rather, the point is that local action cannot be 
confined to the locality; people can only act through states if they put together the 
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coalitions of global forces that will allow them to succeed – but this is just another 
expression of the fact that in general, they cannot act at all without securing a world 
relation of forces that permits them to do it; that is, we live increasingly in a world 
where the major outcomes are determined by force. 
 
America leads the way in this because force is what it has a lot of. The Europeans 
have to achieve the same ends by alliances; as for the poor, they can only do it by 
securing solidarity. But this is not at all impossible. For example, Cuba – one of the 
smallest states in the world – has achieved it in the teeth of US fury for many decades 
so far. The real problem is hence not the dissolution of the nation state but the 
deconstitution of solidarity. The idea that anyone could succeed in local action 
without securing a global coalition that permits them to survive was always utopian. 
Now it is just more so, but not because of globalisation but because it is ever more 
intolerable, in a world where the survival of much of US capital depends on the rest of 
the world, for the US state to accept deviations or exceptions. 
 
The most important task therefore facing the Seattle movement is precisely the 
reconstitution of solidarity, and the targets they have chosen are just and valid 
precisely because they affect very large numbers of poor people, so there is a very big 
constituency for this solidarity. To this extent I think it has been tremendously 
effective. Where it can go wrong is if it mistakes cause and effect; if it supposes that 
the only thing to be changed or reformed are the rules of the international institutions 
themselves, whereas in reality, what has to be changed is the political relation of 
world forces that allows them to impose these rules on starving peoples. What is 
required is the basic solidarity of economic self-determination; to say that any country 
and any state in the world, be it Cuba, China, Argentina, Malaysia or South Africa, 
has the right to determine its own economic policies in the interests of its people, and 
that this is a higher right than the right of creditors to their pound of flesh. I think this 
is a completely practical policy and course of action. 
 
This is I think relevant to the question of bourgeois ideology.  I tend to be sceptical 
about some of the rather fanciful theorising that one finds in the journals and 
newspapers. I am a great fan of Galileo. He was actually a devout catholic – but 
nevertheless, he started from facts and in the process, overturned the doctrine of the 
very institution in which his life was invested. Facts exist; I agree, as post-modernists 
note, that for different observers and different theories, there will be great variation 
both in what is reported as a fact and in how a fact is reported. something else. But 
what I mean by fact in this context is something which imposes itself on your 
consciousness no matter what your conceptual framework.  
 
To be obstinately and vulgarly Realist, there is no ‘deconstructed reality’ in which the 
world trade towers did not fall. It may be experienced, described, perceived and 
theorised very differently by many different people but to deny that it happened 
would not be participating in a de-centred totality – it would be participating in a 
psychotic delusion. 
 
The effects of globalisation are facts in this sense. The ever-growing gap between rich 
and poor is so dominant a fact that no-one can get away with ignoring it. War is 
equally impossible to deny. There is almost nobody left, on any side of the argument, 
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who seriously claims that the present globalisation of capital has increased equality, 
or that the world is more peaceful than it was 20 years ago.  
 
There is a dispute about whether and to what extent the influence of the state has 
decreased. The answer to this question to me depends in the last analysis on whether 
the current stage of history has given rise to a stable mode of organising the world. If, 
in the wake of a growing impoverishment of the world, you cannot meet the most 
basic needs of constituing a functioning polities and communities, then those affected 
will increasingly be driven to acts of desperation, regions of the world will become 
increasingly unstable, and people who seek to resist will use whatever instrument is to 
hand. I think it inconceivable that they will not seek to use the state and the question 
will then in the last analysis boil down to force. What determines whether or not a 
state can function to carry out a policy designed to mitigate, offset or negate the effect 
of the world market depends not on the world market but on world politics – 
basically, on whether the current US government lets them get away with it. 
 
The basic issue is therefore whether a stable world order can arise on the basis of 
accelerating differentiation, which is what we have actually, factually seen, in the 
1980s and 1990s. I remain unbelievably sceptical about that.  
 
I think the word globalisation has unfortunately become an element in an ideological 
battle. Actually, we have reached a certain stage of world history and the key thing is 
to understand the key driving forces of it. It doesn’t make an enormous difference 
what we can call. We can call it ‘big red Mac’ or any name we choose; it will not in 
itself stop what is really going on.  
 
The tendency of the academic theorist is to ascribe real historical events, which are in 
the last analysis the outcome of conscious human action, to processes which they seek 
to present as inevitable.  
 
If you need to secure support for, or at least compliance with, something that actually 
represents a private or sectional interest – for example that of Wall Street’s financiers 
– then it is always a bad idea to simply present that interest openly and say ‘this 
should happen because it is good for me and my friends, because it will make us 
much wealthier.’ The first thing you look for is a theoretical framework in which your 
opponents believe that there is no other choice.  
 
Many evil absolutisms begin with the idea that what they implement is the way the 
world was intended to be. The old religions orders justified much barbarity on the 
grounds that God decreed it. Nowadays this kind of function has been taken over by 
economic analysis, and God has been replaced by Nature. Economic theory, 
particularly neoliberal theory, presents all its principal analytical constructs as 
‘natural’ – the ‘natural’ rate of interest, the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment, and so on. 
 
So when world  globalisation brings about circumstances that threaten its own 
existence, one deals with this by sticking the word ‘nature’ in front of the words 
‘world order’ and presenting globalisation as ‘natural’ and the opposition to it as 
‘unnatural’ or ‘unscientific’. Actually, most of the malign disruptive forces that 
threaten capital globalisation have been called into existence by capital globalisation 
itself. It has enraged a whole generation of youth. It has plunged countries like 
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Afghanistan into a crisis so dire that it becomes replaced by lawlessness or barbarism. 
It has virtually dissolved the basis of poitical stability in countries such as Argentina 
and perhaps Turkey too. 
 
The scientific view is to recognise the structural instability of the process, ask what its 
dynamic is, and from there work out what may happen when – as now – it starts to 
give way to a new stage of history because the old stage cannot support or reproduce 
its own institutions, the basis for its own existence. 
 
The overwhelming tendency of the globalisation of capital is so far that it 
concentrates capital in the metropolis, rather than globalising it to the periphery. The 
creation of a single capital market increases all the dissolutive tendencies of the 
globalisation process; the process contradicts itself. The future of the state depends 
not on some abstract theory, but on what people now decide to do about that, as the 
dissolutory process brings these basic facts increasingly to their conscious attention. 
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